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Relative deprivation theory and social justice theory are applied in a study of grievance 
formation in South Africa. We hypothesized that grievance formation is affected by 
objective conditions (race and class) and subjective conditions (comparisons with oth- 
ers and across time, trust in government, and perceived influence on government). 
Between 1994 and 1998 we annually interviewed separate samples of South Africans. 
Our findings suggest that people's sense of grievance has become less related to race 
than to class. Furthermore, we found an interplay of the two kinds of comparisons in 
the formation of grievances. Depending on the comparison made and on the outcome 
of that comparison, it appears that people find it either easy or difficult to cope with a 
low living standard. These assessments are further qualified by trust in and influence on 
government. Trust and influence make people optimistic about the future and therefore 
more inclined to believe that their situation will improve. 
The apartheid policies of the pre-1994 
South African government resulted in a 
deeply divided society (Sisk 1995). Racial 
cleavages ran through every sector of society: 
South Africans were classified as either 
black, colored, Indian, or white. This classifi- 
cation in turn determined one's life chances: 
where one was allowed to live, with whom 
one was allowed to associate, where one was 
allowed to go to school, the kind of work one 
could get, the church to which one belonged. 
Apartheid politics had imposed race upon 
the South Africans as the overpowering iden- 
tity (Marx 1998). Africans (blacks) occupied 
the lowest status of all four categories; the 
coloreds were next lowest, the Indians were 
next highest. The whites reserved the highest 
status in South African society for them- 
selves. 
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ported by the Human Science Research Council, 
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Obviously, many years must pass before 
the racial cleavage loses its significance. 
Differential treatment of citizens will contin- 
ue to be based on racial categorization for a 
long time, not only as a legacy from the past, 
but also because of the affirmative action 
programs that have been implemented to 
correct past injustices (South Africa Survey 
1996/1997). Will the enduring existence of the 
racial cleavage continue to generate griev- 
ances? This question is vitally important for 
the country. 
It is a well-documented social phenome- 
non that differential treatment is not neces- 
sarily converted into grievances. In the past, 
the racial cleavage obviously did generate 
grievances, as witnessed by the long-lasting 
struggle against apartheid. Will it continue to 
do so, now that the political landscape has 
been altered so dramatically? Or will cleav- 
ages other than the racial divide come to 
determine grievances in South African soci- 
ety? 
These questions about the formation of 
grievances are not trivial. They possess not 
only tremendous political importance, but 
also great theoretical significance. As for the 
political importance, in a country that is 
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socioculturally as heterogeneous as South 
Africa, any grievance defined along sociocul- 
tural lines poses a potential political threat. 
As long as grievances are distributed ran- 
domly in a society, they are politically neu- 
tral. If members of a group feel that their 
group is treated unjustly, however, group- 
based grievances will develop. Such griev- 
ances become politically relevant because 
aggrieved groups may-and often do-mobi- 
lize and demand change. 
Grievance theory has little to say about 
such mobilization processes. Relative depri- 
vation and social justice theories-two well- 
known families of grievance theories in social 
psychology-give little attention to mobiliza- 
tion, even though protest is mentioned as a 
behavioral consequence of relative depriva- 
tion and feelings of injustice (Hegtvedt and 
Markovsky 1995; Tyler et al. 1997). Tradi- 
tionally, the mobilization of aggrieved people 
has been the subject of social movement 
research. Today's "ruling" paradigms- 
resource mobilization and political process 
theory-have always concentrated on why 
and how aggrieved people mobilize (for an 
overview, see Tarrow 1998). The question of 
why and how people become aggrieved has 
received much less attention. This is not to 
say that students of social movements regard 
grievances as irrelevant; rather, as protago- 
nists of resource mobilization and political 
process theory argue, grievances are so ubiq- 
uitous in a society that their mere presence is 
not sufficient to explain the emergence of 
social movements. 
Because of this lack of interest in the for- 
mation of grievances, relative deprivation 
theory, a grievance theory that formerly was 
important in the social movement domain, 
has lost its relevance for students of social 
movements. In general, very little systematic 
theorizing has been undertaken on the for- 
mation of grievances in the social movement 
literature. To be sure, the concept of a collec- 
tive action frame, especially its component 
injustice frame, resulted in a renewed focus 
on grievances (for a synthetic treatment, see 
Klandermans 1997). Even so, very little has 
been said to date about the formation of such 
frames. Grievance theory in the social move- 
ment domain became enmeshed in ever more 
highly elaborated taxonomies of grievances, 
but how such grievances are formed 
remained largely unspecified. 
As for the theoretical significance, the 
case of South Africa is interesting precisely 
because it is the situation in which we may 
expect that the racial divide will continue to 
exist, but in a political context that has 
changed dramatically. The South Africa case 
provides a unique opportunity to investigate 
questions about the formation of grievances 
that cannot be studied in relatively stable 
societies. On the one hand, in a society in 
transition, changes in the sociopolitical con- 
text may trigger the formation of new griev- 
ances. On the other, old grievances may 
disappear because people may feel that their 
situation is improving or because they are 
optimistic about the future. 
In this paper we define grievances as 
feelings of dissatisfaction with important 
aspects of life such as housing, living stan- 
dard, income, employment, health care, 
human rights, safety, and education. We will 
show that such feelings of dissatisfaction are 
not linked to objective outcomes in a simple 
way. Two literatures are proposed to clarify 
the reason: relative deprivation and social 
justice. The reasoning we develop here is 
applied to a description and an understand- 
ing of the changing patterns of grievances in 
South Africa. We hope we can demonstrate 
that sophisticated grievance theory-specifi- 
cally, relative deprivation and social justice 
theory-remains relevant for the study of 
social movements. 
THE FORMATION OF GRIEVANCES 
Differential treatment of citizens does 
not necessarily generate grievances. 
Obviously, grievances are the result of some 
kind of evaluation. Relative deprivation the- 
ory emphasizes the importance of compar- 
isons in determining outcome evaluations 
(for overviews, see Hegtvedt and Markovsky 
1995; Tyler et al. 1997; Tyler and Smith 1998). 
Stouffer et al.(1949) were the first to point 
out that people compare their rewards with 
those of others in a comparison group and 
that the outcome of this comparison deter- 
mines their evaluation. 
Other classic varieties of relative depri- 
vation theory were proposed by Davies 
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(1962) and Gurr (1970), who have concen- 
trated on people's comparisons with them- 
selves at different points in time. People 
compare their current situation with either 
their past experiences or their future expec- 
tations. Objectively a group may be in a dis- 
advantaged situation, but its members may 
feel that the situation has improved in com- 
parison with the past. As a consequence, they 
may be satisfied. They will be more satisfied 
if they expect that the situation will continue 
to improve in the future. Indeed, both Davies 
and Gurr explain contention by citing peo- 
ple's growing concern that the experienced 
improvements will not continue. Davies' 
famous J-curve hypothesis and the various 
types of relative deprivation distinguished by 
Gurr are all about the concern that future 
outcomes will no longer meet expectations 
for the future. 
An important conceptual distinction, 
that between individual and group relative 
deprivation, was introduced by Runciman 
(1966)-egoistic and fraternalistic depriva- 
tion, in Runciman's terminology. People (1) 
may feel personally deprived or (2) may feel 
that the group to which they belong is 
deprived. Research suggests that feelings of 
group relative deprivation increase the likeli- 
hood of collective behavior, whereas feelings 
of individual relative deprivation increase 
the likelihood of individual-level behavior 
(Martin 1986). 
Later versions of relative deprivation 
theory (Crosby 1982; Muller 1980) intro- 
duced the concepts of deserved and entitled 
outcomes. The most recent versions 
(Atkinson 1986; Folger 1987; Masters and 
Smith 1987) attempt to build conceptual 
bridges to other social psychological 
approaches such as social comparison and 
social cognition. These versions try to resolve 
the ambiguities surrounding the choice of 
different bases of comparison. 
In their review, Tyler and Smith (1998) 
suggest that sociological versions of relative 
deprivation theory have placed more empha- 
sis on intrapersonal comparisons with the 
past or the future, whereas social psychologi- 
cal theories of relative deprivation empha- 
size interpersonal comparisons with other 
people or groups. Research suggests that 
people often prefer to make downward com- 
parisons with people who are worse off in 
order to enhance or protect their own feel- 
ings of self-worth, rather than making 
upward comparisons with people who are 
better off, which can lead to feelings of rela- 
tive deprivation (Tyler and Smith 1998). 
Therefore inequality often fails to generate 
grievances simply because people are not 
making the "right" comparisons (Major 
1994). 
Contrary to what Tyler and Smith sug- 
gest, time also plays a role in social psycho- 
logical relative deprivation theories. These 
theories emphasize the significance of opti- 
mism: that is, grievances are reduced by the 
expectation that the situation will improve in 
the future. Results from laboratory studies 
provide evidence supporting this assumption 
(Folger 1987). 
Hegtvedt and Markovsky (1995) point 
out that relative deprivation theory concen- 
trates on a comparison of output without tak- 
ing differences in input into account. Equity 
theory, however, proposes that outcomes are 
evaluated in terms of the associated input: 
people who have invested more should 
receive more. In fact, most people in Western 
societies believe that economic inequality is 
justified because they believe they live in a 
just world, where people deserve what they 
get and get what they deserve (Lerner 1980). 
Yet according to Hegtvedt and Markovsky 
(1995), the evaluator's position in society 
tempers the perceived fairness of equality. 
Individuals occupying lower positions in the 
stratification system seem less likely to judge 
inequality as fair; instead they favor a more 
equal distribution. Indeed, individuals in 
lower positions seem to prefer equality to 
equity, whereas individuals in higher posi- 
tions seem to prefer equity to equality. 
Procedural Justice 
Perceived fairness of procedures is a core 
variable in theories of social justice (Tyler and 
Smith 1998; Tyler et al. 1997; for an applica- 
tion in the South African context, see Roefs, 
Klandermans, and Olivier 1998). These theo- 
ries distinguish distributive justice from pro- 
cedural justice. Distributive justice concerns 
the distribution of outcomes, whereas proce- 
dural justice concerns the procedure used for 
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distributing outcomes. Obviously, relative 
deprivation theory is about outcome distribu- 
tions that are deemed unjust. 
According to social justice theory, an 
important reason for considering outcome 
distributions unjust is that people doubt the 
fairness of the procedures employed to arrive 
at that distribution. People are more satisfied 
with a specific distribution of public goods if 
they regard the distribution procedures as 
fair. Thibaut and Walker (1975) argue that 
the key procedural characteristic shaping 
people's views about the fairness of proce- 
dures is the distribution of control between 
the parties. If people actually have been 
involved in the decision-making process, pro- 
cedures are more likely to be deemed fair 
(Tyler and Lind 1992). Thus, for the South 
African case, we hypothesize that grievances 
are more likely to develop if people feel that 
they have no influence on the new authorities 
in South Africa. 
Tyler and his colleagues (Tyler and Lind 
1992; Tyler and Smith 1998), in their evalua- 
tion of the fairness of procedures, argue that 
people are not driven only by instrumental 
motives-that is, by the extent to which they 
have been able to influence the outcomes- 
but also by relational issues. Such issues 
include people's evaluation of the decision- 
making process as unbiased and honest, the 
trustworthiness of others in the relationship 
(in particular, authorities), and the degree to 
which people feel that they are respected. 
Evidence suggests that trustworthiness is typ- 
ically the most important factor shaping eval- 
uations of authorities (Tyler and Smith 1998): 
people seem to place great weight on their 
inferences about the motives and intentions 
of the authorities with whom they deal. 
In the South African situation, this point 
leads us to hypothesize that grievance forma- 
tion depends on the trustworthiness of the 
new authorities in the eyes of the people. 
Thus grievances will be more likely to devel- 
op in South Africa if people feel that the 
unequal distribution of outcomes between 
social groups results from procedures that 
they deem unfair. People's view of the fair- 
ness of procedures is affected by the extent to 
which they feel that they have been able to 
influence the new authorities, and by the 
degree to which they feel that the new 
authorities can be trusted. 
Summary 
Our brief tour of relative deprivation 
and social justice theory results in a few 
hypotheses about grievance formation. First, 
we assume that people will be aggrieved if 
they occupy a low position in society (Hyp. 
1). Basically, this hypothesis proposes that 
objective conditions affect grievance forma- 
tion. 
Our second hypothesis capitalizes on the 
effect of comparison. We hypothesized that, 
net of the impact of objective conditions, 
comparison adds to the process of grievance 
formation: regardless of their objective situa- 
tion, people will be aggrieved if (a) they feel 
that their situation is worse than that of oth- 
ers and/or (b) worse now than in the past, 
and/or (c) if they expect that it will not 
improve in the future (Hyp. 2a, 2b, 2c). 
Our third hypothesis concerns the com- 
bined effect of objective conditions and com- 
parisons. We hypothesize that the grievances 
generated by poor objective conditions will 
intensify if people feel (a) that they are worse 
off than others, or (b) that their situation has 
declined over the past few years, or (c) that 
their situation will not improve in the future 
(Hyp. 3a, 3b, 3c). 
Our fourth hypothesis concerns the mod- 
erating effect of the evaluation of the govern- 
ment as the authority in control of 
distributing wealth in a society. We hypothe- 
size that the grievances generated by poor 
objective conditions will intensify if people 
(a) don't trust government and/or (b) don't 
feel that they have an influence on govern- 
ment (Hyp. 4a, 4b). 
In the remainder of this paper we test 
these hypotheses with data collected in South 
Africa between 1994 and 1998. 
METHODS 
Design 
Annual surveys in random samples of the 
South African population have been conduct- 
ed since 1994. Face-to-face interviews were 
conducted in people's homes by trained inter- 
viewers of the interviewees' ethnic back- 
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ground, who spoke their language. The inter- 
views were based on structured questionnaires. 
The first interviews took place in February 
1994, the period just before South Africa's first 
democratic elections. The subsequent waves of 
data were collected in March 1995,1996,1997, 
and 1998.The five waves are based on separate 
samples of 2,286, 2,226, 2,228, 2,220 and 2,227 
respondents respectively. 
Respondents 
The respondents were drawn by means 
of a multiple-stage cluster probability sample 
design. The population the sample was drawn 
from were all South African residents age 18 
and older. We stratified the sample according 
to provinces1 and by a classification of 
socioeconomic regions: tribal, traditional 
rural areas in former homelands; squatter 
areas; hostels, hotels, and boarding schools in 
urban areas both metropolitan and non- 
metropolitan;2 townships for coloreds, 
Indians, and Africans, metropolitan and non- 
metropolitan; town and cities, metropolitan 
and nonmetropolitan; and rural areas exclud- 
ing former homelands. The sampling alloca- 
tion to these strata was made proportionally 
to the 1991 population figures, with a few 
exceptions: provinces were given a minimum 
of 120 respondents; the minimum number of 
Indians was fixed at 120; and we introduced 
an additional sub-sample for live-in domestic 
workers.3 
As a consequence of the sampling proce- 
dures, unweighted results are not representa- 
tive of the South African population. For our 
purposes, however, it is more important that 
the samples are drawn according to the same 
1 The stratification for the African population was 
conducted differently for the first survey because at 
that time South Africa was still divided into former 
homelands and the rest of the country. In the first sur- 
vey, we stratified the African sample into these areas 
and into metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. 
The regional distribution of the 1994 sample is very 
similar to those of the later samples, however. 
2 Metropolitan areas are those around cities such as 
Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and Pretoria. 
Nonmetropolitan areas surround the smaller cities. 
3 In the 1994 sample design, we stated no fixed min- 
imum per region. Numbers were fixed, however, for 
the population groups: 1,252 Africans, 600 whites, 300 
coloreds, and 200 Asians. 
principles and thus are comparable. For that 
matter, the sampling design guarantees that 
the regional breakdowns of the samples are 
almost identical. The differences between the 
sampling design of the first survey and the 
latter four surveys, however, result in differ- 
ent proportions of Africans, coloreds, 
Indians, and whites in the first survey than in 
the latter four. Over-time comparisons of the 
samples' four racial groups on age, gender, 
and education reveal that these groups are 
similar as to gender, but slightly different in 
age and level of education. Yet MANOVAs 
with the key variables of our study as depen- 
dent variables (measures b, c, d, and e; see 
below) and with age, education, and time as 
factors reveal no significant interactions. 
Hence there is no indication that the 
observed age and educational differences 
between our samples explain the variation 
over time in these key variables. 
Measures 
a. Demographics. These measures are 
population group (African, colored, Indian, 
white), age, gender, education, income, 
employment status, occupation, language, 
and religion. 
b. Outcome distribution. We developed a 
living standard measure based on the avail- 
ability, in the household, of a variety of items 
ranging from electricity and running water to 
a microwave oven. 
c. Grievances. We assessed grievances by 
asking our respondents how satisfied they 
were with their general personal situation, 
the neighborhood they live in, the job they 
have or their chances to get a job, the educa- 
tional opportunities in their communities, 
their standard of living, the health care avail- 
able, the recognition of their human rights, 
and the safety in the area where they live 
(answered on a seven-point scale ranging 
from "extremely dissatisfied" to "extremely 
satisfied"). We combined the eight questions 
into a scale of distributive grievances ranging 
from 1 ("not at all aggrieved") to 7 ("very 
much aggrieved") (Cronbach's alpha = .84). 
d. Relative deprivation and future expec- 
tations. We asked our respondents (1) 
whether their general personal situation is 
better or worse than that of other people in 
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South Africa; (2) whether their general per- 
sonal situation is better or worse than it was 
about five years ago; and (3) what they think 
their general personal situation will be five 
years from now. The questions were 
answered on a seven-point scale from 1 
("very much better") to 7 ("very much 
worse"). 
e. Influence on and trust in authorities. We 
assessed this variable with two questions. The 
first question tapped perceived influence on 
government: "Do you agree or disagree with 
the statement 'people like you can have an 
influence on governmental decisions'?" (on a 
seven-point scale ranging from "disagree 
very strongly" to "agree very strongly"). The 
second tapped trust in government: "How 
often do you trust the government to do what 
is right for people like you?" (never, seldom, 
sometimes, mostly, always). The two ques- 
tions are correlated at r = .36. 
RESULTS 
Our first hypothesis states that people 
occupying a low position in society will be 
aggrieved. We have tested this hypothesis for 
race and class, the two main stratification cri- 
teria in South Africa. 
Figure 1 maps the mean scores of the 
four racial categories on our grievance scale. 
In 1994 the four groups' relative positions 
were what one would expect: the Africans 
were the most aggrieved and the whites the 
least; the coloreds and the Indians occupied 
an intermediate position. After 1994, howev- 
er, race became less important in explaining 
grievances: Africans became less aggrieved 
and whites became more aggrieved, while 
the relative position of the coloreds and 
Indians remained more or less stable. By 
1998 the grievance levels of Africans, col- 
oreds, and Indians were identical. Although 
whites were more aggrieved than in the past, 
they were still less aggrieved than any other 
group.4 
4 Indeed, regression analyses revealed that the 
variance in grievances explained by race declined 
from 23 percent in 1994 to 3 percent in 1998. A two- 
way analysis of variance with time and race as factors 
revealed no main effect of time, a main effect of race 
(F = 13.56, df = 3,p < .001), and a significant interac- 
tion of race with time (F = 23.91, df = 12,p < .001). 
Our findings for class are what one 
would expect and seem to be more stable. As 
our indicator of class, we used outcome distri- 
butions as indicated by income and living 
standard. The zero-order correlation 
between grievances (on the one hand) and 
income and living standard (on the other) 
remained fairly stable through the years and 
hovered around -.30. That is, the lower peo- 
ple's income and living standard, the more 
aggrieved they are. Not surprisingly, income 
and living standard are highly correlated: the 
correlations throughout the five years under 
study vary between .60 and .70. Because the 
results for income and for living standard are 
essentially the same, we restrict ourselves in 
the remaining analyses to living standard as 
our indicator of outcome distribution. 
Even today, race and class are social cat- 
egories that overlap strongly in South Africa. 
Our data also reveal this point unequivocally. 
In 1998,42 percent of the variance in income 
and living standard was still explained by 
race; hence, we had to disentangle the effects 
of the two. To do so, we conducted regression 
analyses with race and class as the indepen- 
dent variables and grievances as the depen- 
dent variable. 
Table 1 presents the results of these 
regression analyses. Blacks, coloreds, and 
Indians are contrasted with white South 
Africans, and we employed living standard as 
our indicator for class. The pattern that 
emerges is extremely interesting. Over the five 
years under study, race became almost irrele- 
vant, whereas living standard gained in signifi- 
cance. In 1994, race explained 23 percent of 
the variance in grievances while living stan- 
dard explained nil, but these percentages were 
3 percent and 6 percent respectively in 1998.5 
Thus, net of race, living standard became 
more important over the years as a predictor 
of grievances. This is illustrated in Table 2, 
where the living standard measure is broken 
down into three levels: low, medium, and 
high.6 The means are provided for distributive 
grievances for the racial categories at these 
5 We checked these and all other regression analy- 
ses for normality, homoscedasticity, and excessively 
influential data points, applying SPSS residual statis- 
tics and plots. We found no problems in that regard. 
6 We broke down the total sample into three groups 
of approximately the same size. 
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Note. Dissatisfaction scores are based on a scale comprising levels of dissatisfaction with the neighborhood, 
employment, education, living standard, health care, human rights, and safety. A score of 1 means "very much 
satisfied"; a score of 7 means "very much dissatisfied." 
Figure 1. Dissatisfaction 
Table 1. Grievances Regressed on Race and Living Standard: Unstandardized Coefficients 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
African 1.31 1.31 1.12 .96 .58 .31 .36 .07 .45 .00 
(.06) (.07) (.06) (.08) (.06) (.07) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.08) 
Colored .68 .71 .62 .61 .26 .01 .40 .20 .36 .19 
(.08) (.08) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.07) (.11) (.06) 
Indian .71 .68 .68 .58 -.04 .28 .29 .33 .43 .27 
(.08) (.08) (.09) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.07) (.09) (.09) (.11) 
Living Standard -.02 -.05 -.08 -.09 -.14 
(.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
R2 .23 .23 .18 .19 .07 .09 .02 .05 .03 .09 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
three levels for the first and the last year. In 
1994, grievance levels were determined by 
racial categories, whereas living standard was 
less relevant. By 1998, it was the other way 
around: racial categories were less relevant 
and living standard made the difference. 
Thus, after 1994, the direct effect of race 
on people's sense of grievances decreased; 
the indirect effect via living standard became 
more significant. In other words, race seems 
to be replaced by class. To be sure, class is 
linked closely to race, but class seems to have 
become more important than racial catego- 
rization in regard to satisfaction or dissatis- 
faction with outcome distributions. 
Grievances are now determined by "what 
people have" and no longer by "who they 
are." 
In summary, the results confirm our first 
hypothesis. People who occupy lower posi- 
tions in the South African society are more 
aggrieved than those in higher positions, 
although the impact of objective conditions 
on grievance formation has declined over the 
years. Our most important finding, however, 
concerns the changes in the relative signifi- 
I 
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Table 2. Grievances: Race and Living Standard 
1994 1998 
Living Standard Living Standard 
Low Medium High Low Medium High 
African 4.70 4.68 4.58 4.27 3.88 3.76 
Colored 3.84 4.10 4.23 4.18 4.10 3.97 
Indian -4.07 3.98 4.32 3.85 
White - 3.45 3.26 4.03 3.63 
Note: Only very few Indians and whites report a low living standard. 
cance of race and class. The objective condi- 
tions of living standard (class) have come to 
matter more than the objective conditions of 
political rights (race) in explaining a person's 
sense of grievance. 
Intra- Versus Interpersonal Comparisons 
Our second hypothesis links grievance 
formation to choice of comparison. We made 
a distinction between interpersonal compari- 
son (comparison with others) and intraper- 
sonal comparison (comparison over time). 
We assumed that net of the impact of objec- 
tive conditions, people will be aggrieved if (a) 
they feel that their situation is worse than 
that of others and/or (b) worse now than in 
the past, and/or (c) if they fear that it will 
decline in the future. Each of these hypothe- 
sized effects was observed, as revealed by the 
regression analyses in Table 3. 
In this table the three types of compar- 
isons are entered in the equation in a second 
step after the effects of race and living stan- 
dard have been determined. They add consid- 
erably to the variance in grievances 
explained, as the figures indicate. Obviously 
people feel aggrieved because they regard 
their situation as worse than that of others 
and/or worse than their own situation in the 
past, and/or because they expect that it will 
decline. Each of these comparisons con- 
tributes independently of the other compar- 
isons to people's sense of grievance. All three 
effects are fairly stable. Together the three 
comparisons add some 30 percent to the vari- 
ance in dissatisfaction explained by race and 
class in each equation. 
Interpersonal comparisons, however, are 
far more important than intrapersonal com- 
parisons. Apparently a sense of grievance 
about the distribution of outcomes is deter- 
mined especially by the assessment that one's 
Table 3. Grievances Regressed on Race, Living Standard, and Inter- and Intrapersonal Comparisons: 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
African 1.29 .85 .97 .91 .32 .46 .08 .22 .02 .19 
(.07) (.06) (.08) (.06) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.07) (.06) 
Colored .71 .38 .63 .51 .02 .06 .13 .11 .19 .23 
(.08) (.06) (.09) (.07) (.09) (.08) (.07) (.06) (.09) (.05) 
Indian .69 .48 .60 .50 .31 .32 .32 .25 .28 .26 
(.09) (.07) (.10) (.08) (.09) (.08) (.09) (.08) (.11) (.05) 
Living .01 .01 -.04 .00 -.07 -.02 -.08 -.03 -.14 -.07 
Standard (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Comparisons .43 .36 .31 .29 .27 
With Others (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Comparisons .18 .15 .10 .08 .15 
With the Past (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Expectations -.00 .09 .07 .09 .13 
for the Future (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
R2 .23 .56 .19 .50 .09 .34 .05 .34 .09 .39 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
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situation is worse than that of others and, to a 
lesser extent, by the assessment that the situ- 
ation is worse now than five years ago or will 
decline in the next five years. This finding 
makes sense: grievance, as we assessed it, per- 
tains to the distribution of outcomes in a soci- 
ety, and interpersonal comparisons obviously 
are more informative about that distribution 
than intrapersonal comparisons. Yet intraper- 
sonal comparisons add explanatory power. 
Regardless of how their outcomes relate to 
those of others, people feel aggrieved if their 
position has declined in relation to the past 
or if they fear that it will decline in the future. 
On the other hand, people also feel more sat- 
isfied if their position has improved or if they 
expect it to improve, even if it is currently 
worse than that of comparison others. 
Moderating Grievance Formation 
The moderating effect of comparisons. 
Our third hypothesis concerns the moderat- 
ing effects of inter- and intrapersonal com- 
parison on grievance formation. We 
hypothesized that the outcomes of such com- 
parisons may sharpen or soften someone's 
sense of grievance. That is, disappointing out- 
comes become even more disappointing if 
people believe that others are better off, or 
that current outcomes have declined, or that 
future outcomes will not improve. 
To test these assumptions, we broke 
down the total sample on the basis of the 
scores for the three types of comparisons in 
groups of approximately the same size: (1) a 
group of people who feel that their situation 
is better than that of others, a group of people 
who feel that their situation is more or less 
the same as that of others, and a group of 
people who feel that their situation is worse 
than that of others; (2) a group of people who 
feel that their situation has improved from 
the past, a group who feel that their situation 
has remained more or less the same, and a 
group of people who feel that their situation 
has declined; and (3) a group of people who 
expect their situation to improve in the 
future, a group who expect that their situa- 
tion will remain more or less the same, and a 
group who expect their situation to decline. 
We then conducted regression analyses for 
each group in each of the five years, with race 
and living standard as independent variables 
and grievances as dependent variable (Table 
4). In this way we could assess whether the 
effect of objective conditions on grievance 
formation was moderated by the outcomes of 
comparisons. 
Table 4 gives the R2 values for race and 
for race and living standard. The relative size 
of these values for the three groups is impor- 
tant for our discussion, both within a given 
year and as they develop over time. 
Expectations for the future especially moder- 
ate the link between objective conditions and 
grievances: objective conditions continue to 
exert a considerable effect on grievances 
only for people who fear that their situation 
will decline. In fact, in 1998 the impact of race 
and class on grievances is higher than for the 
previous years. At the same time, objective 
conditions lose their influence on grievance 
formation among those who expect that their 
situation will improve. People who believe 
that their situation will remain the same 
occupy an intermediate position. 
Comparisons with the past exert a simi- 
lar but less dramatic effect, while interper- 
sonal comparisons do not seem to matter. 
This suggests that a low position in society 
especially affects grievance formation among 
people who fear that their situation will not 
improve, and/or who find that it has not 
improved thus far. For all groups, the impact 
of living standard increases in relation to that 
of race. Apparently our earlier finding that 
class became more important than race holds 
in combination with the various outcomes of 
these comparisons. 
Intrapersonal comparison (comparison 
of time) seems to moderate the formation of 
grievances, and to do so much more strongly 
than interpersonal comparison. Apparently 
quite a few South Africans feel that they are 
part of an ongoing process of change which 
has brought improvements in the past and is 
expected to continue doing so. The reverse is 
also true, of course: those who feel that they 
are in a climate of decline seem to translate 
their objective conditions more rapidly into 
grievances. 
The moderating effect of beliefs about 
government. As we mentioned in our theoret- 
ical introduction, grievances may sharpen or 
soften for yet another reason. Procedures 
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Table 4. Race, Living Standard, and Grievances Moderated by Comparisons With Others and Comparison 
With the Past, and by Expectations for the Future: R2 Values 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Comparison With Others 
Better: 
Race 
Race + liv. std. 
Same: 
Race 
Race + liv. std. 
Worse: 
Race 
Race + liv. std. 
Comparison With the Past 
Better: 
Race 
Race + liv. std. 
Same: 
Race 
Race + liv. std. 
Worse: 
Race 
Race + liv. std. 
Expectations for the Future 
Better: 
Race 
Race + liv. std. 
Same: 
Race 
Race + liv. std. 
Worse: 
Race 
Race + liv. std. 
.15 .14 .04 
.16 .14 .04 
.22 .20 .09 
.22 .20 .09 
.05 .05 .03 
.05 .05 .03 
.17 .12 .06 
.19 .12 .06 
.33 .31 .13 
.34 .32 .13 
.21 .31 .13 
.22 .31 .13 
.27 
.27 
.12 .05 
.12 .06 
.38 .34 .19 
.38 .35 .19 
.20 .48 .19 
.20 .49 .20 
.01 .02 
.01 .04 
.06 .01 
.08 .05 
.00 .01 
.03 .05 
.03 .01 
.03 .05 
.12 .07 
.17 .11 
.04 .09 
.06 .15 
.02 .01 
.02 .04 
.16 .06 
.21 .10 
.14 .25 
.17 .30 
that have led to the existing distribution of 
outcomes may be considered fair or unfair; 
depending on such evaluations, distributive 
justice may be evaluated more or less favor- 
ably. We assumed that people's evaluation of 
authorities influences their assessment of 
their situation. Perceived influence on 
authorities and trustworthiness are two 
important aspects of such an evaluation: 
Authorities who are perceived to be open to 
influence attempts and to be trustworthy sup- 
posedly make people more optimistic about 
the future (Tyler and Lind 1992). 
We begin our discussion of the results 
with the latter assumption. Indeed, trust in 
government and perceived influence over 
government are related to future expecta- 
tions (Table 5). 
The more positively people evaluate the 
South African government, the more opti- 
mistic they are about the future. The correla- 
tions for expectations about the future are 
considerably higher than those for relative 
deprivation, based on comparisons with oth- 
ers. They are also higher than those for rela- 
tive deprivation, based on comparisons with 
the past, but here the differences are smaller. 
Comparisons of trust and influence reveal 
that trust has the stronger relationship to 
expectations for the future. This confirms 
Tyler and Lind's (1992) observation that 
trustworthiness is the most important factor 
shaping evaluations of authorities. 
Apparently, trust in and influence over 
government are more relevant for compar- 
isons over time than for comparisons with 
others; of the two comparisons over time 
(comparisons with the past and expectations 
for the future), future expectations are influ- 
enced more strongly. Trust in authorities is 
like a blank check, as Barnes and Kaase 
(1979) remarked. It is the feeling that one's 
interests receive attention even if the author- 
ities are subject to little supervision or scruti- 
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Table 5. Comparison With Others and With the Past, and Expectations for the Future, with Trust in 
Government and Influence on Government: Pearson's rs 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Trust in Government 
Others -.20 -.11 -.16 -.09 -.11 
Past -.16 -.19 -.30 -.22 -.22 
Future -.09 -.35 -.39 -.34 -.39 
Influence on Government 
Others -.03 -.06 -.14 -.11 -.05 
Past -.07 -.15 -.19 -.17 -.15 
Future -.13 -.25 -.29 -.29 -.17 
ny. Such trustworthiness makes people opti- 
mistic about the future, and such optimism, as 
we noted in our previous section, softens cur- 
rent distributive grievances. 
Do trust and influence also moderate the 
relationship between living standard and dis- 
tributive grievances, as our fourth hypothesis 
suggests? Table 6 reports results from analy- 
ses that address this question. For these 
analyses we executed a median split to create 
two groups that were high and low on both 
trust and influence. For these groups, again, 
we conducted regression analyses with race 
and living standard as independent variables 
and grievances as the dependent variable. 
The R2 values largely confirm our expec- 
tations: correlations are higher if trust and 
influence are low than if trust and influence 
are high. The first year is the exception: in 
1994 we found the reverse pattern. That was a 
volatile year, however. Our interviews were 
conducted in the months before the elections, 
the old government was still in place, and 
nobody knew what the elections would bring. 
In those days of uncertainty, half of our 
respondents feared that their situation would 
decline, whereas the other half was divided 
approximately equally between people who 
expected everything to stay the same and 
people who expected their situation to 
improve. Under these circumstances, expec- 
tations about the future acquired a different 
meaning, related much more closely to the 
country's political future and much less close- 
ly to individual outcomes. 
For the remaining four years, R2 values 
for those who trust government or feel that 
they can influence government are consider- 
ably lower than for those who do not trust 
government and who do not feel able to 
influence government. In other words, objec- 
tive conditions are more likely to lead to 
grievances if people do not trust government 
or feel that they have no influence on gov- 
ernment. Also in these analyses, the effect of 
living standard gradually replaces that of 
race. 
Table 6. Race, Living Standard, and Grievances Moderated by Trust in Government and Influence on 
Government: R2 Values 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Trust in Government 
Low 
Race .17 .29 .09 .09 .08 
Race + liv. std. .17 .29 .11 .13 .14 
High 
Race .27 .17 .09 .02 .03 
Race + liv. std. .28 .17 .10 .04 .07 
Influence on Government 
Low 
Race .17 .24 .10 .07 .06 
Race + liv. std. .17 .26 .11 .11 .15 
High 
Race .27 .15 .06 .02 .02 
Race + liv. std. .27 .15 .08 .02 .04 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Our study has produced interesting 
results. First, we found that racial categoriza- 
tion has lost its relevance for the formation of 
grievances, despite its unabated significance 
for differences in living standards. In 1998,42 
percent of the variance in living standard still 
could be explained by racial categories. In the 
explanation of a sense of grievance, however, 
race was replaced by class as indicated by 
income and living standard. The direct effect 
of race disappeared and was replaced by an 
indirect effect via class. 
Second, net of objective conditions inter- 
personal and intrapersonal comparisons 
were shown to be important for the forma- 
tion of grievances, explaining 30 percent of 
the variance in grievances. Of the two types, 
interpersonal comparison appeared to be by 
far the more important. In regard to moder- 
ating effects, however, intrapersonal compar- 
isons (especially expectations for the future) 
were more important. Being worse off than a 
comparison other generates a strong sense of 
grievance, but occupying a low position also 
generates a sense of grievance, especially if 
such a position is due to a decline from past 
circumstances and/or is unlikely to improve 
in the near future. 
Third, trust in government and perceived 
influence on government affect comparisons 
over time (intrapersonal comparison), but 
not comparisons with others (interpersonal 
comparison). The more people trust govern- 
ment, and the more they feel able to influ- 
ence government, the more they feel that 
they have improved their situation over the 
past five years and the greater their optimism 
about the future. 
Fourth, trust in government and per- 
ceived influence on government moderate 
the translation of low outcomes into griev- 
ances. Among people who do not trust gov- 
ernment or who feel unable to influence the 
government, chances are high that low out- 
comes will generate a sense of grievance. On 
the other hand, among those who are high in 
trust and perceived influence, low outcomes 
are less likely to result in grievances. 
Obviously the racial cleavage did not dis- 
appear in South Africa; nobody would have 
expected it to do so in only a few years 
(Marais 1998). Our findings, however, suggest 
that the racial cleavage no longer defines 
people's sense of grievance. Grievances now 
are related more closely to actual income and 
living standard-in other words, to social 
class. Of course, class coincides with race, but 
over the years class also has become more 
important as a distinction within race. This 
distinction has gained significance for the 
explanation of grievances. 
The transition from race to class as a 
determinant of distributive grievances is an 
intriguing phenomenon. Indeed, one could 
argue that the South African society has 
begun to normalize. A sense of grievance 
about the distribution of wealth in society is 
now determined less by apartheid's racial 
categorization and more by the actual distri- 
bution of wealth in the country. The impor- 
tance of objective conditions for grievance 
formation declined over the years, however. 
Certainly, class has become more important, 
but not important enough to compensate for 
the declining impact of race. 
Grievances not only are formed by 
objective conditions such as race or class, but 
also depend on the comparisons made in 
assessing the objective situation. In fact, the 
effect of comparisons by far outweighs the 
effect of objective conditions. The subjective 
component of grievance formation, as deter- 
mined by comparison, played an important 
role in the formation of grievances through- 
out the whole period. Regardless of the 
objective conditions, comparisons suggesting 
that one is worse off than others or worse off 
than in the past, or the expectation that one's 
situation will be worse in the future, are pow- 
erful generators of grievances. The outcomes 
of such comparisons explain a considerable 
proportion of the variance in grievances; in 
addition, comparisons (especially compar- 
isons over time) moderate the translation of 
objective conditions (whether caused by race 
or by class) into grievances. 
The choice of basis for comparison 
makes a difference. Comparison with others 
(interpersonal comparison) has a strong 
direct impact on people's sense of grievance, 
much stronger than comparison over time 
(intrapersonal comparison with past or 
future). Comparisons over time, however, are 
much stronger moderators than comparison 
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with others. Apparently it is easier to cope 
with a low position that results from an 
improvement over the past than with a low 
position that has stayed the same or even is 
worse than in the past. Similarly, a low posi- 
tion that is expected to improve is easier to 
cope with than a low position that is expected 
to stay the same or even to decline further. 
Thus, depending on the choice of basis for 
comparison, it is not only the evaluation of 
the situation that varies; the dynamics of 
grievance formation vary as well. 
With inequalities of the size that one 
finds in South Africa, comparisons can easily 
generate high levels of relative deprivation 
either directly or indirectly. Depending on 
the kind of comparisons made, this reaction 
can be politically dangerous if people feel 
that the group they identify with is disadvan- 
taged. On the other hand, large proportions 
of the population-especially the African 
population-are optimistic about the future, 
trust their government, and believe they can 
influence its decisions. That attitude makes it 
easier to cope with low outcomes. If people 
feel that the authorities have their hearts in 
the right place, they are not only more pre- 
pared to accept the existing situation but also 
inclined to believe that it will improve. After 
all, they believe, government is doing its 
utmost to change the situation. That belief, in 
its turn, makes it easier to live with the cur- 
rent situation. For that matter, it is helpful 
that the Africans-who objectively are the 
most deprived-are the most optimistic and 
the most positive about the government. 
Findings like these raise a question: how 
long will the disadvantaged maintain their 
trust in government and their optimism? 
That depends on the extent to which the gov- 
ernment actually can improve their situation. 
Our findings suggest two possible scenarios. 
In the first, the government works to 
reduce inequality. In doing so, it not only 
reduces dissatisfaction-because fewer peo- 
ple feel deprived-but also makes itself more 
trustworthy and creates more optimism 
about the future. These feelings in turn make 
more bearable the inequality that continues 
to exist. 
In the second scenario, the government 
fails to reduce inequality, forfeits trust, and 
makes people pessimistic about the future. 
This combination of inequality, lack of trust, 
and pessimism intensifies dissatisfaction. Let 
us recall the classic scenario that Davies pro- 
jected with his J-curve of the improvements 
which make people expect that their situa- 
tion will continue to improve. This scenario 
may materialize if the government fails to 
deliver what it promised. 
These findings suggest the continued rel- 
evance of relative deprivation theory and 
social justice theory-or, more generally, 
grievance theory-for the social movement 
domain. Provided that more sophisticated 
conceptualizations, measurements, and 
analyses are employed, relative deprivation 
still is relevant for understanding political 
protest. To be sure, grievances are not suffi- 
cient conditions for the occurrence of 
protest. On the other hand, people who are 
protesting are aggrieved. Understanding how 
such grievances are formed remains a con- 
structive endeavor. 
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